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Recent Development 
Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean: 
What Law is and Who Makes It 
Kristine A. Bergman* and Joseph Weishampel** 
On January 21, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Department of 
Homeland Security v. MacLean.1  In a 7–2 decision written by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Court held that to satisfy the Whistleblower 
Protection Act (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), limitations on 
whistleblower protections must be established specifically by statute, 
not by administrative rules or regulations.2  The Court further held that 
the Transportation Security Administration’s (“TSA”) power to 
“prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . . 
detrimental to the security of transportation” did not give those 
regulations the force of law,3 and that the TSA could not prevent 
disclosure of that information by promulgating regulations.4  Justice 
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, arguing that Congress 
had only given the TSA a mandate to identify the information not to be 
disclosed.5  Therefore, the dissent contended, the limitations on 
disclosures still came from congressional statutes, and were valid rules 
 
* Kristine Bergman is a Juris Doctor Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2015 from 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  She would like to thank Professor Barry Sullivan for 
helping her understand everything about the Supreme Court; Griffen Thorne for his great EIC 
work and this opportunity; and Joseph Weishampel for his hard work and patience. 
** Joseph Weishampel is a Juris Doctor Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2015 from 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  During his time at Loyola, Mr. Weishampel 
competed as a brief writer on Loyola’s National Moot Court team and served as an academic 
tutor.  He would like to thank Griffen for this opportunity, and Kristine for her expertise and 
adaptability. 
1. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015). 
2. Id. at 924; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012) (stating that a whistleblower may report any 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation if “such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law 
and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs”).  Neither party in MacLean 
contended that an executive order was at issue in this case. 
3. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (2012). 
4. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924. 
5. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 925 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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of law.6 
Both the majority and the dissent in MacLean resolved the case on 
the basis of statutory construction.7  Perhaps that explains why this case 
defied the Court’s recent trend, which disfavors government-employee 
whistleblowers.  For example, in the 2006 case Garcetti v. Ceballos, the 
Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a deputy district 
attorney who was reassigned and transferred after he made meritorious 
complaints about the validity of an affidavit.8  Government-employee 
whistleblowers—such as Robert MacLean—had little recent precedent 
to support their arguments. 
The WPA protects a federal employee from any “personnel action”9 
against him or her for the disclosure of any information that the 
employee “reasonably believes evidences—(i) any violation of any law, 
rule, or regulation, (ii) or . . . a substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety.”10  The same provision, however, also includes an 
exception: an employee is not shielded from a personnel action if 
disclosure of the information is “specifically prohibited by law.”11 
In late 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (“ATSA”),12 which established a new federal agency—the 
 
6. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 926. 
7. Id. at 919 (majority opinion) (“The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when 
it omits language included elsewhere applies with particular force here . . . .”); id. at 924 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ‘shall prescribe 
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out 
security . . . .’” (emphasis added) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)). 
8. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425–26; see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 
(1994) (holding that when the government acts as an employer, its powers to abrogate the First 
Amendment are much stronger than in other circumstances).  The Court did hold, in 2014, that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contained whistleblower protections, but these applied specifically to 
private-sector whistleblowers.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).  Lawson did not 
address public employee whistleblowers. 
9. A personnel action is defined as: 
[A]n appointment; a promotion; . . . [a] disciplinary or corrective action; a detail, 
transfer, or reassignment; a reinstatement; a restoration; a reemployment; a 
performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title; a decision concerning pay, 
benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training 
may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance 
evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph; a decision to order 
psychiatric testing or examination; the implementation or enforcement of any 
nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and any other significant change in duties, 
responsibilities, or working conditions. 
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2) (2012). 
10. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 
11. Id. 
12. 49 U.S.C. § 114. 
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TSA—to “address the security of the nation’s transportation system.”13  
The ATSA allowed the TSA to promulgate regulations to define the 
scope of, and restrict the release of, “sensitive security information” 
(“SSI”).14 
Respondent Robert MacLean worked for the Federal Air Marshals 
Service,15 a subsection of the TSA that employed trained individuals to 
“detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, 
passengers, and crews.”16  Air marshals like MacLean were trained on 
SSI regulations, such as the prohibition against disclosing a marshal’s 
flight number and flight times when on a mission.17 
In 2003, MacLean and other air marshals were briefed on a potential 
terrorist threat targeted at long-distance flights, both domestic and 
international.18  Approximately forty-eight hours later, MacLean 
received a text message from a TSA superior stating that until further 
notice, federal air marshals would not be deployed on overnight 
missions from Las Vegas.19  MacLean, concerned about the decision to 
cancel these missions in light of the recent warning, questioned his 
superior about this decision.20  His superior responded that overnight 
missions had been eliminated to save money on hotels, overtime, and 
travel allowances.21 
MacLean, firmly believing these cancellations significantly 
threatened public security, “blew the whistle.”22  He contacted a 
reporter for MSNBC, who subsequently reported on and criticized the 
TSA deployment procedures.23  Thus, TSA was compelled to change its 
plans and not cancel all overnight missions as intended.24 
 
13. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015) (No 
13-894) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 296, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (2001)). 
14. Id. at 2–3; see 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (stating in relevant part, “the Under Secretary 
shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in 
carrying out security under authority of the [ATSA]. . . .  [I]f the Under Secretary decides that 
disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.”). 
15. Brief for Respondent at 9, Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015) (No 
13-894). 
16. Id. (citing Federal Air Marshals, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-air-marshals 
(last updated Feb. 26, 2013)). 
17. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
18. Id. at 7. 
19. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 10. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 10–11. 
22. Id. at 11.  MacLean did attempt to report and question the decision to cancel flights to 
higher authorities within the TSA and was warned not to question his superiors and to consider 
his career’s future.  Id. at 10–11. 
23. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 8. 
24. Id. 
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At the time, MacLean was not identified as the whistleblower in this 
matter.25  MacLean continued to work as an air marshal for the TSA 
until 2005,26 when he anonymously appeared on television to criticize 
the agency’s dress-code policies.27  Despite digital voice alteration, 
MacLean was identified by TSA employees and was formally 
investigated by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in May 
2005.28  During the investigation, MacLean admitted to his involvement 
with the 2003 leak.  In September 2005, MacLean was fired from his 
position as air marshal for disclosing SSI without authorization.29 
MacLean challenged his removal to the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (“MSPB”), arguing, in part, that the message received in the text 
message did not qualify as SSI, and, even if it did, that his disclosure 
was protected by the WPA.30  When the TSA responded to the 
proceeding by issuing an ex parte order declaring the information to be 
SSI, MacLean appealed the order to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit; however, that court, deferring to internal regulations, sided with 
the TSA.31 
When MacLean’s case returned to the MSPB, the Board affirmed the 
agency’s decision.32  The MSPB relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion to 
reason that the text message was properly characterized as SSI.33  
Further, because MacLean had disclosed information that was 
specifically prohibited from release by a promulgated rule, the 
disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law” and thus not subject to 
WPA whistleblower protections.34 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.35  The court 
reasoned that the ATSA did not specifically prohibit the disclosure of 
the relevant SSI because these SSI disclosures were only prohibited by a 
 
25. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 12. 
26. Id. at 13. 
27. Id. at 12. 
28. Id. at 12–13. 
29. Id. at 13. 
30. Id. 
31. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008). 
32. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. SF-0752-06-0611-I-2, 2009 WL 1759557, at 
*12 (M.S.P.B. June 22, 2009). 
33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10. 
34. Id. 
35. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions from the MSPB 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012), whereas other courts of appeal have exclusive review 
of final agency orders issued within lower courts of their jurisdiction pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 
46110(c) (2012). 
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TSA-promulgated regulation.36  Thus the court emphasized that 
“prohibited by law” meant only law as enunciated in a statute.37  The 
DHS petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the 
Court granted.38 
The primary issue argued to the Court was whether “law,” within the 
context of the WPA, was limited to legislative law, or included law 
created by an administrative agency, such as through a regulation or 
promulgated rule. 
Petitioner DHS argued that the SSI-disclosure prohibitions satisfied 
the “prohibited by law” requirement no matter whether they appeared in 
a statute or in an administrative regulation.39  The DHS relied on 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown40 for the assertion that “properly promulgated, 
substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’”41  
Further, because this Chrysler doctrine was so well established in 
American jurisprudence, “[i]t would therefore take a clear showing of 
contrary legislative intent”42 for a court to define “law” so narrowly as 
to exclude administrative rules and regulations.43  Thus, as the DHS 
argued, because nothing in the WPA provides a clear showing that “by 
law” was intended to exclude SSI disclosure regulations,44 a court 
should follow Chrysler and assume “by law” includes those 
regulations.45 
The DHS also pointed to the legislative history of the WPA to 
support its broader interpretation of “by law.”  Originally the Senate 
proposed to limit the exception to disclosures to those “prohibited by 
statute,” but later adopted the broader “prohibited by law” language.46  
Although the DHS acknowledged that clearly Congress intended that 
some agency regulations be excluded in the “by law” meaning, this did 
not mean that all regulations were excluded from the “by law” scope.47 
Finally, the DHS argued that a decision in MacLean’s favor would 
contravene public policy, and specifically would threaten public safety.  
For example, an employee who wrongfully disclosed SSI to avoid 
 
36. MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1309. 
37. Id. 
38. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (2014) (mem.). 
39. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 19. 
40. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
41. Id. at 295, n.18, cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 19. 
42. Id. at 296, cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20. 
43. Id., cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20. 
44. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 25–26. 
47. Id. at 26. 
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disciplinary action could use the WPA as a shield against employment 
termination.48 
Respondent MacLean’s argument focused on the fact that “by law” 
cannot include an administrative “rule or regulation” in this specific 
statute when the statute earlier uses the specific “law, rule, or 
regulation” language within the same provision.49  Further, MacLean 
relied on the purported purpose of the WPA, arguing that if an agency 
could promulgate rules preventing disclosures of information supported 
by reasonable cause, this would “close off the very openness the WPA 
seeks to create.”50 
The Court relied heavily on the text of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 to hold that 
MacLean’s disclosures were protected.51  Specifically, the Court held 
that the many references to “law, rule, or regulation” in § 2302 
indicated that a reference only to “law” should be read to exclude “rule” 
or “regulation.”52  The Court also noted that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) 
vests discretion in the TSA, which supported the Court’s 
interpretation.53  Finally, the Court declared that it was unmoved by the 
government’s public policy argument; even if there existed an urgent 
need to prevent disclosure, that was a matter for Congress or the 
President.54 
As noted, the Court relied primarily on the text of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 to 
determine that statutes, not rules or regulations, must set forth the 
disclosures that are not protected whistleblower disclosures.  It noted 
that Congress used the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” on numerous 
occasions throughout § 2302.55  Conversely, the text at issue in 
MacLean referred only to “law.”56  The Court then cited the well-
known interpretive principle that when Congress includes certain 
 
48. Id. at 36.  Specifically, the WPA protections could “embolden federal employees to 
disclose SSI and gravely endanger public safety.”  Id. at 38. 
49. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 19. 
50. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 22. 
51. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015). 
52. Id. 
53. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921. 
54. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923–24. 
55. Id. at 919.  For example, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E) (2012) (regarding marital status 
discrimination), § 2302(b)(6) (regarding preferences or advantages), and § 2302(b)(9)(A) 
(regarding the exercise of appeals) all refer to “law, rule, or regulation.” 
56. See text accompanying supra note 2.  In fact, in the text at issue in MacLean, Congress 
used the full phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the same sentence as the shorter phrase 
“otherwise prohibited by law”; it also used the broader phrase “law, rule, or regulation” nine 
times in § 2302.  5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(2)(D)(i), 2302(b)(1)(E), 2302(b)(6), 2302(b)(8)(A), 
2302(b)(8)(A)(i), 2302(b)(8)(B)(i), 2302(b)(9)(A), 2302(b)(12), 2302(b)(13), 2302(d)(5); 
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919. 
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language in one part of a statute, but omits it in another, it is presumed 
to have acted intentionally.57  The Court held that the textual difference 
between § 2302(b)(8)(A) and the rest of § 2302 indicated that Congress 
intended that congressional statutes, but not rules or regulations, would 
establish exceptions to general whistleblower protection.58 
Next, the Court rejected the government’s argument that, because 
they had the force of law, some regulations—such as those considered 
here—could properly be considered law under 5 U.S.C. § 
2302(b)(8)(A).59  The Court noted that Congress’s choice of text 
“provides the necessary ‘clear showing’ that ‘law’ does not include 
regulations” in this case, thus overcoming the Chrysler presumption.60  
For this reason, the Court concluded that the regulations promulgated by 
the TSA could not be considered law for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 
2302(b)(8)(A).61 
The final section of the Court’s textual analysis considered, and 
rejected, the government’s claim that MacLean’s disclosures were 
“specifically prohibited” by 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1).62  As the Court 
pointed out, 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) does not prohibit anything; instead, it 
authorizes the Under Secretary to prohibit certain disclosures at a future 
time.63  The Court also rejected DHS’s argument that 49 U.S.C. § 
114(r)(1) imposes a legislative mandate on the TSA to prohibit certain 
disclosures,64 noting that the statute “says that the TSA shall prohibit 
disclosures only ‘if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the 
information would . . . be detrimental to the security of 
transportation.’”65  From this text, the Court reasoned that 49 U.S.C. § 
114(r)(1) did not specifically prohibit MacLean’s disclosure, and 
 
57. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919; Dep’t of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 931 (1990); 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
58. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 920. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
61. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921. 
62. Id.  The relevant portion of the statute reads: 
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, the Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations 
prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security 
under authority of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71) 
or under chapter 449 of this title if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the 
information would—(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) reveal a 
trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information; or (C) be 
detrimental to the security of transportation. 
49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) (2012). 
63. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921. 
64. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921. 
65. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 922. 
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because the Under Secretary exercised discretion to make decisions not 
attributable to Congress, TSA regulations did not have the status of law 
for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302.66 
The Court also considered public policy arguments.  It noted that 
reading “law” broadly to include rules and regulations could permit any 
agency to issue a blanket regulation against whistleblowing, thus 
defeating the purpose of whistleblower statutes.67  However, the Court 
did acknowledge the potential public safety issue if all of the TSA’s 
employees were permitted to voice their concerns publicly over 
sensitive safety matters.68  Ultimately, the Court decided that Congress 
or the President would have to act69 to prohibit disclosures such as those 
Robert MacLean made.70 
Thus, relying heavily on statutory text, and also considering balance-
of-power issues, the Court held that the TSA’s regulations were not law 
for the purpose of § 2302(b)(8)(A).  Therefore, Robert MacLean’s 
disclosures were protected. 
In a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Sotomayor also 
focused on the text of the statutes in question, but concluded that Robert 
MacLean’s disclosures were “prohibited by law” within the meaning of 
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).71  The dissent agreed that regulations could 
not establish prohibited disclosures, and that prohibiting disclosures was 
analytically distinct from exempting information from disclosure 
requirements.72  However, the dissent argued that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) 
specifically prohibited the disclosure at issue in MacLean.73  That 
statute provides that the TSA “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the 
disclosure of information.”74  The dissent read “shall” to mean 
“must,”75 which it considered a direction with limited discretion, not an 
authorization.76  The dissent further asserted that the TSA’s role is 
 
66. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923. 
67. Id. at 920. 
68. Id. at 923. 
69. Id. at 923–24.  The Court listed a number of actions that Congress could take, including 
exempting sensitive information from whistleblower laws, overriding § 2302(b)(8)(A)’s 
whistleblower protections, or exempting the entire TSA from § 2302(b)(8)(A)’s coverage.  Id. 
70. Id. at 924 (“Although Congress and the President each has the power to address the 
Government’s concerns, neither has done so.  It is not our role to do so for them.”). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
72. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. 
74. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
75. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995)). 
76. Id. at 924. 
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limited to identifying information prohibited from disclosure; this 
limited, near-ministerial role indicated to the dissent that the 
prohibitions had the status of law.77  The dissent also claimed that it 
would respect what it saw as the clearly expressed intent of Congress to 
prohibit disclosures such as those made by MacLean and would read 49 
U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) as prohibiting MacLean’s disclosures.78  Therefore, 
the dissent cited statutory text and congressional intent to support its 
argument that the TSA prohibitions enacted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 
114(r)(1) qualified as law under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). 
Because MacLean involved a whistleblower and a whistleblowing 
statute, some commentators have emphasized the effect the case may 
have on substantive whistleblower law.  Others, however, have viewed 
the case only through the lens of textual analysis.  Regarding the 
former, Washington Post commentator Joe Davidson asserted that a 
decision for the government would mean that “Uncle Sam will have 
greater power to bully whistleblowers,” and that the American people 
would lose if MacLean lost.79  Conversely, at SCOTUSblog, Steve 
Vladeck noted the Justices’ discomfort during oral argument with the 
government’s textual arguments: 
Justices Elena Kagan and [Antonin] Scalia both appeared 
underwhelmed by [the government’s argument that some regulations 
are “law” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)], with the latter 
suggesting . . . that such a distinction was too “subtle,” and that any 
argument that Congress intended such a distinction when it enacted 
the whistleblower statute is “hard to believe.”80 
Writing after the Court announced the decision, Vladeck cast the case 
as both a statutory construction case and a national security case.81  
According to Vladeck, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent drove home national 
security concerns, and even Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the 
issue by stating that Congress could alter the laws as necessary.82 
Lower courts that have applied MacLean have generally cited it for 
 
77. Id. at 924–25. 
78. Id. 
79. Joe Davidson, Federals Whistleblower Have a Lot at Stake in First Supreme Court Case 
Directly Affecting Them, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2014, at A17. 
80. Steve Vladek, Argument Analysis: Government’s Position in Air Marshal Whistleblower 
Case too “Subtle” for Justices, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2014/11/argument-analysis-governments-position-in-air-marshal-whistleblower-case-too-su 
btle-for-justices/. 
81. Steve Vladek, Opinion Analysis: Justices Adopt Broad View of Whistleblower Protections 
in Air Marshal Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 
15/01/opinion-analysis-justices-adopt-broad-view-of-whistleblower-protections-in-air-marshal-di 
spute/. 
82. Id. 
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its rules of statutory construction.  Only one case, Losada v. Department 
of Defense, has cited MacLean for its substantive rule that statutes, but 
not rules or regulations, can define those disclosures that lie beyond the 
protection of whistleblower statutes.83  Three cases have cited MacLean 
for the principle that a legislative body acts intentionally when it 
includes language in one clause but omits the same language in a nearby 
clause.84  It remains to be seen if MacLean’s substantive implications 
for whistleblower protections will affect future cases, or if lower courts 
will resolve these questions on the basis of statutory interpretation. 
Some may see MacLean as heralding greater whistleblower 
protections.85  While this is possible, MacLean’s reasoning was tied 
specifically to the statutory text in question, making it easy to limit if 
the Court so chooses.  On the other hand, the Court confirmed that 
governmental agencies may not insulate themselves against employee 
whistleblowers such as Robert MacLean.  In other whistleblowing 
contexts, MacLean’s implications are unclear. 
 
83. Losada v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 2014-3047, 2015 WL 452017, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 
2015). 
84. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 14-60295, 2015 WL 791418, at 
*3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2015); Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., No. 11-cv-
6201, 2015 WL 640875, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Blind v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., No. 14-cv-85, 2015 WL 349156, at *5 n.3 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2015).  One other case has 
cited MacLean for statutory construction purposes, specifically its reading of “shall” as 
mandatory.  Ruiz v. Flores, No. 1:14-cv-00179, 2015 WL 966148 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015). 
85. See text accompanying supra notes 79–82. 
